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1  Introduction 
A major disruption to family life can have serious consequences for children. A particularly 
traumatic event is the permanent departure of the head, or main decision-maker, from the 
household. There are at least three different channels through which this can affect children’s 
human capital accumulation, and in particular their school and work participation (more 
discussion of the following points is to be found in Case et al, 2004 and Gertler et al, 2004). 
First, it is likely to involve a substantial income loss, particularly if the head is a working 
male, and this may be important for school choices in the presence of credit and insurance 
market failures. Second, the balance of decision-making power within the household may 
change, with the preferences of remaining adults gaining increased importance, which may 
have important consequences for children. Third, it is likely that the head is a parent, the loss 
of whom can have significant emotional and psychological consequences for children. The 
importance of the first and third channels were highlighted in a recent World Bank 
Development Outreach report (Bell et al, 2006) 
 
‘if parents sicken and die while their children are still young, then all the means needed to 
raise the children so that they can become productive and capable citizens will be greatly 
reduced. The affected families’ lifetime income will shrink, and hence also the means to 
finance the children’s education, whether in the form of school fees or taxes. On a parent’s 
death, moreover, the children will lose the love, knowledge and guidance which complement 
formal education.’  
 
Some countries, particularly in Africa, have put in place policies to provide education and 
health support to children who have lost one or both parents. These policies appear to be a   4
response to the increase in HIV-associated mortality, which has resulted in millions of 
children losing parents to AIDS. Yet loss of a parent due to death or divorce whilst a child is 
still young is a pervasive phenomenon.  Despite this, there is surprisingly little evidence on 
how children are affected by the loss of one or more parents (recent exceptions are referred to 
below). In this paper we investigate how the permanent departure of the head from the 
household affects children’s school enrolment and work participation. We consider mainly 
losses that are due to death or divorce, and that can thus be reasonably considered to be 
adverse events. We are interested in school and work participation because it is well-known 
that they affect the human capital accumulation of children (though we measure only short-
term impacts in this paper); moreover child work also affects family income and therefore 
current poverty.  
 
In the econometric analysis, we use household-level fixed effects to deal with the fact that 
households that experience the departure of the household head are likely to differ in 
unobserved ways from those that do not. Our results are robust to the presence of non-random 
attrition from the panel, which is important to take into account if there are common 
unobserved factors explaining the decision to send children to school/work and attrition. We 
find remarkably different effects for boys and girls. For boys, the adverse event reduces 
school participation and increases participation in paid work, whereas for girls we find 
evidence of the adverse event having a beneficial impact on schooling.  
 
Our findings suggest that the mechanisms explaining the consequences of adverse events on 
schooling and child labour decisions are complex and different for boys and girls. For boys, 
we provide a number of pieces of evidence consistent with the departure having an important 
effect through the income reduction associated with it. First, our findings are observed mainly   5
in remote areas in which borrowing constraints and insurance market failures are likely to be 
more acute (Becker and Tomes, 1986). Second, the effects vary in the expected way with 
household wealth (measured before the adverse event). Third, we observe a similar pattern of 
findings when we use a crop loss as a proxy for a negative income loss (see Beegle et al, 
2006a).  
 
In contrast, we find no evidence to suggest that the income loss associated with the departure 
affects adversely the school participation of girls (note we do not consider paid work for girls 
due to low rates of female participation in this activity). In fact, we find that girls’ school 
participation increases after the adverse event. We provide evidence to suggest that the 
change in the household decision-maker is a potentially important factor behind this effect. 
Using relative age and education levels of the former and new heads as proxies for relative 
bargaining power, we show that the change in bargaining power associated with a change in 
head from male to female is beneficial for girls. This finding is consistent with the presence of 
differential intra-household preferences, with mothers preferring to devote resources to 
improving the well-being of daughters as opposed to sons, in line with findings by Thomas 
(1990). 
 
Our work first fits into the growing literature in developing countries on parental deaths and 
children’s education. This literature investigates the importance of different channels in 
explaining the observed impacts (Beegle et al, 2006b, Case et al, 2004; Gertler et al, 2004; 
Yamano and Jayne, 2005; Evans and Miguel, 2007). In short, it generally finds adverse 
effects on education, particularly on primary school participation, and the findings tend not to 
be entirely explained by the income loss associated with the death. A novelty of our work is 
that we also consider the effects on child labour (though for boys only due to data   6
constraints), which, to our knowledge, has not been considered in this literature, and yet 
which is an important economic activity amongst children in developing countries and one 
which may be particularly responsive to an adverse event that induces an income reduction.  
 
Our work also fits into the strand of the literature that considers the relationship between other 
negative income shocks, such as crop losses, and children’s work participation (Jacoby et al., 
1997; Beegle et al, 2006a; Dehejia and Gatti, 2005; Duryea et al, 2007; Dammert, 2007; 
Guarcello et al.2003). In line with this literature, our results for boys - increases in child 
labour following sudden reductions in family income - are consistent with the presence of 
credit and insurance market failures in Colombia.  
 
There is also some existing evidence that impacts of income shocks may be different for boys 
and girls. If parents “prefer” investing in boys than in girls (for example, because returns to 
resources are greater if invested in boys than in girls), then liquidity constrained households 
may withdraw more resources from girls than from boys when resources shrink. The evidence 
on this points to the schooling of girls suffering more than that of boys after income losses 
(Sawada, 2003; Parker and Skoufias, 2006). Our finding that the schooling of girls may 
increase after the departure of the household head stands in contrast to these findings. We 
argue that, among the very poor households in rural Colombia represented in our sample, the 
departure of the head may be less detrimental to the schooling of girls than that of boys, 
because it tends to result in females taking over from males as household heads, thus 
potentially increasing the decision-making power of females. To our knowledge, only Gertler 
et al. (2004) used a related argument in their theoretical discussion on the fact that death of a 
mother may be more detrimental for the schooling of daughters than death of father, if 
mothers favour daughters.     7
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the data that we use 
in this research. After presenting the empirical methodology in section 3, we discuss the 
results for boys and girls in section 4, and go on to conclude in Section 5. 
 
2  Data 
2.1  Background 
We use three years of panel data from a survey of households and individuals in rural 
Colombia. These data have been collected to evaluate a large scale welfare programme 
Familias en Acción (FeA from hereon), which has been in place in rural areas of Colombia 
since 2002, and which has since expanded to cover urban areas. The programme aims at 
alleviating poverty by fostering human capital accumulation among the poorest households 
through conditional subsidies for investments into education, nutrition and health. Attanasio 
et al (2009) contains a more complete description of the programme and an evaluation of its 
impacts on children’s schooling and work. 
 
The first wave of data collection for the evaluation of this programme took place in 2002, and 
around 11,500 households were interviewed. We refer to this as the first survey. A year later, 
a second wave of data was collected, with a third wave collected in 2006, which we refer to as 
the second and third surveys respectively. In this work, we use data from all three rounds, 
though we only consider the effects of the adverse event on children’s outcomes in the second 
and third surveys (note, both of these are post-programme). This is because the adverse event 
that we are considering is the permanent departure of the head since the previous wave, which 
is thus not defined for the first wave. 
    8
The data are rich, reflecting interviews that lasted on average 3.5 hours. They contain 
information on household socio-demographic structure, dwelling characteristics, use of 
healthcare services, anthropometric indicators, household consumption and assets, individual 
education and labour supply, income and transfers. 
2.2  Descriptive statistics 
The sample we use comes from surveys that were conducted in 122 municipalities in rural 
Colombia, with each municipality containing less than 100,000 inhabitants. Municipalities 
contain both a rural and a relatively more urbanised district, which we refer to as ‘rural’ and 
‘urban’ areas respectively. The ‘urban’ part contains the ‘cabecera municipal’, which is the 
centre of government of the municipality. It is also expected to have at least 3,000 inhabitants 
and various public facilities including a city hall, a school and a health centre. The ‘rural’ part 
includes the other, more remote parts of the municipality. 
2.2.1  Outcomes 
The outcome variables we consider are discrete indicators for children’s school and paid work 
participation, though we consider the latter outcome for boys only as, as we will see, very few 
girls participate in paid work. School participation relates to whether the individual is enrolled 
in school at the time of the survey. Work participation is measured using information from a 
module specific to paid work, and includes having spent the majority of the week prior to the 
survey engaged in paid work or actively looking for a job. Thus this category captures “full-
time” paid workers.
1  
                                                 
1 Amongst the sample of boys in paid work, just under 11% of them are also enrolled in 
school, and amongst those enrolled in school just 2% of them report being in paid work as 
well.   9
 
In Table 1, we show the proportions of our sample enrolled in school and participating in paid 
work, by age, separately for males and females. We see that school enrolment rates are high 
amongst children aged 7-11, corresponding to primary school.
2  The first substantial drop in 
enrolment is observed at age 12, at the transition from primary to secondary school. Another 
point worth noting is that school enrolment of females is higher than that of males. 
Engagement in paid work is considerably higher for males than for females, and is very low 
for both before the age of 12 (we do not observe participation in paid work for individuals 
below age 10). These trends lead us to confine our main analysis to children aged 12 through 
17. Moreover, we consider paid work as an outcome for boys only, given how low it is for 
girls, at around 5.2% on average. 
                                                 
2 The school system in Colombia operates as follows. Compulsory education is free and lasts 
for nine years, and consists of basic primary (five years, ages 7 through 11) and basic 
secondary (educación básica secundaria, four years, ages 12 through 15). The secondary 
school system also includes the middle secondary cycle (educación media, two years, ages 16 
and 17). Successful completion of studies leads to the Bachillerato. Students must pass an 
entrance examination/test for access to universities.   10
Table 1: School and paid work participation, by age and gender 















7  92.8  -  94.0 - 
8  94.6 - 96.3 - 
9  95.9 - 96.8 - 
10  95.3 0.5 96.3 0.2 
11  92.9 0.8 95.6 0.2 
12  88.9 2.3 91.8 0.7 
13  82.2 5.2 87.7 1.8 
14  75.3 10.4 83.0 2.9 
15  67.0 16.3 78.0 5.4 
16  58.2 23.9 66.7 11.3 
17  44.4 35.2 56.0 13.1 
12-17  70.5 14.6 78.9 5.2 
N  21,503  15,875  19,262  14,008 
NOTES:- Based on FeA surveys 2 and 3. Urban and rural areas pooled.  
 
2.2.2  Adverse Event 
In order to capture a potentially very important disruption to family life, we restrict attention 
to the permanent departure of the household head since the previous survey.
3 We define this 
to have occurred if the head died, got divorced, or left along with his partner since the 
previous wave (hence precluding the use of children’s outcomes at the first survey from the 
analysis). Throughout the text we refer to this as an ‘adverse event’. The percentage of our 
sample of households (i.e. those with at least one 12 to 17 year old, at either the second or 
third surveys) in which the head departed permanently since the previous wave is 4.4%. Of 
these, around 20% are due to death, 60% are due to divorce or separation and, in the 20% of 
                                                 
3 The household head is defined in our survey as the person whom all other household 
members perceive as such. Our interpretation is that this perception is likely to be very closely 
tied to his/her earnings capacity and decision-making power.   11
remaining cases, the spouse left along with the head.
4 The average age of heads who departed 
is around 44. 
 
Despite the reasonably low occurrence of this adverse event, it is likely to be a very 
significant event in a child’s life. One reason for this is that it results in a substantial income 
reduction. To have a cleaner measure of this, we define the adverse event as departures of 
heads who were previously working and thus contributing to household income. This is 
approximately 78% of heads that departed. To get an idea as to the extent of the income loss 
associated with the adverse event, we compare total household earnings of adults (aged 18+) 
in households which did and did not experience this adverse event in the previous period. 
Table 2 shows the coefficients from a regression of the log of total household earnings on the 
adverse event.
5 In households in which the head departed, total household adult earnings are 
lower by around 25% compared with households in which the head did not depart 
(conditional on the variables listed in the note to the table).   
 
Note that in an additional 4% of households the head departed the household since the 
previous survey for some other unknown reason (so it is difficult to know to what extent it is 
                                                 
4 We assume that heads who left with their spouse are unlikely to return to the household, and 
thus consider it to be a permanent departure from the household. As their proportion in the 
sample is very low, it was not possible to test for heterogeneous impacts of adverse events in 
such households. 
5 Note that this regression gives a lower bound of the magnitude of the adverse event in terms 
of total household adult earnings, as it includes labour supply responses to it, which are likely 
to mitigate the potential adverse effects on income. We exclude earnings from children to 
mitigate this problem.   12
an adverse event, or whether the departure is likely to be permanent), or departed due to 
death/divorce but was not working beforehand (so it may not capture an income loss). We see 
from Table 2 that departure of the head for other reasons is also negatively correlated with 
current household earnings, though the magnitude is considerably lower (row 2). As the 
concern with this is that it may include heads who have left temporarily to earn money 
elsewhere, we do not use it as a proxy for an adverse event (though we control for it 
throughout the analysis).  
Table 2 Marginal effects, OLS regression of  
log current household earnings on the adverse event 
Dependent variable household earnings    










NOTES:- Control for household earnings at time t-1, time effects, adult composition of the 
household, sex, age quadratic and education level of the head, crop loss. Robust standard 
errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. N is the number of households with non-
zero earnings in waves 2 and 3. 
+significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.  
 
Whether such adverse events are fully anticipatable or not, it is unlikely that the very poor 
households in our sample have ways to fully insure against the income losses they entail, in 
particular in the most remote (rural) parts of the municipalities where credit and insurance 
markets are thin (Edmonds, 2006). In these conditions, we expect them to affect household 
decisions to send their children to school/work. 
 
In addition to income losses, the adverse event is likely to have a number of other important 
repercussions. First, the household head is likely to be one of the key decision-makers in the 
household, so such a departure may bring about important changes in bargaining power and 
decision-making within the household, which may affect children’s education and work.   13
Second, the household head is usually a parent, which is an important figure head for 
children. Indeed, amongst households that experienced this adverse event, 80% of the time it 
is a father that departs.
6  In the empirical analysis, we will address these different channels. 
 
A concern with using such a proxy for an adverse event is that it may not be exogenous to the 
outcomes of interest, child labour and schooling. For example, couples may split up due to 
having different preferences over investment in children. Though we have no reason to 
believe this to be the case in our context, we can get some informal indication as to whether it 
is a potential issue, by considering whether these households are different in their decision-
making  before divorcing. To do this, we use data from a module on decision-making 
administered to women at the first survey, before the divorce. We consider two measures 
relating to decision-making between partners. The first is whether the mother reports that it is 
she who makes decisions about taking the child to the doctor, school attendance, and 
purchasing children’s clothes. The second is whether the mother reports that she alone can 
decide on how to spend any extra money she may receive. We do not find any statistical 
differences in decision-making amongst households in which the head subsequently left due 
to divorce, versus households in which the head left for some other reason, as shown in Table 
                                                 
6 We do not consider departures other than of the household head because the surveys allow 
us to observe the child’s relationship to the head only, not to any other household members. 
Though we can sometimes infer relationships between people based on their relationships to 
the head, this is not always the case. So if anyone else in the household left, we do not know 
with certainty the child’s relationship to him/her. In any case we are most interested in the 
head, who is likely to be the most important person when it comes to the household economy 
and decision-making.   14
3.  Though this is just one aspect of decision-making, this evidence nonetheless alleviates 
concerns that divorce is more driven by a decision-making imbalance than death. Note, 
moreover, that in our empirical analysis we will control for potential related endogeneity 
problems, which we return to below. 
Table 3 Comparison of decision-making amongst couples who subsequently got divorced 
and couples who split up due to death/other reasons 
 
 









Mother makes decisions relating to 






Female has full power to decide how 






Number of households  218  140   
NOTES:- Data from the first survey. 
 
More generally, departure of the household head may not be a random event even when it is 
due to death. If this is the case, failure to control for it would result in biased estimates of the 
effect of the adverse event on outcomes. To investigate this, we compare observable 
characteristics of households in which the head did and did not subsequently depart, in Table 
4 below. Note that the characteristics in the table pertain to the first survey (i.e. before the 
departure happened). Households that did and did not experience this adverse event generally 
share similar characteristics, such as family composition, income levels, and area 
characteristics. However, there are some differences, though they are of low magnitudes: 
households that went on to experience the adverse event have slightly younger, more educated 
(conditional on having some education) heads at the first survey, contain more 7-11 year old 
girls and live closer to a school.    15
 
Table 4 Comparison of pre-adverse event household and municipality characteristics 
across households that do and do not experience an adverse event  
 
Characteristic, wave 1 ↓ 
Departure of household head (D) 
  D=1 D=0  P-value 
Age of household head  44.04  46.25  0.001 
Age of spouse  39.72  42.33  0.000 
Education of head      
   None  0.276  0.276  0.989 
   Incomplete primary  0.504  0.591  0.001 
   >= Complete primary  0.180  0.114  0.0001 
Education of spouse       
   None  0.236  0.237  0.978 
   Incomplete primary  0.593  0.639  0.082 
   >= Complete primary  0.171  0.124  0.011 
Household composition       
   Ave # of kids 0-6  0.413  0.415  0.898 
   Ave #  of boys 7-11  0.668  0.648  0.622 
   Ave #  of girls 7-11  0.748  0.592  0.0001 
   Ave #  of boys 12-17  0.702  0.709  0.870 
   Ave #  of girls 12-17  0.625  0.634  0.807 
   Ave # of female adults  1.440  1.429  0.797 
   Ave # of male adults  1.402  1.376  0.603 
School enrolment rate of  
7-17 year olds in household 
0.843 0.820  0.180 
Programme area  0.590  0.586  0.870 
Altitude 568.07  595.70  0.475 
Distance to school   11.07  13.18  0.001 
Household consumption at time  
of first survey 
74946.6 74533.5  0.716 
# households  356  7,840   
 NOTES:- The sample consists of households in which there is at least one  
  12-17 year old in either the second or third survey.  Characteristics in the table  
  pertain to the first survey. 
  
Whilst we can control for all of these variables in the analysis, this does not mitigate concerns 
that the two household types may also differ along unobserved dimensions that are correlated 
with the outcomes of interest.  If this is the case, then failure to control for this would result in 
biased estimates of the effect of the adverse event on outcomes. We discuss how we deal with 
this econometrically in section 3.   16
2.3  Attrition  
One concern that must be addressed is non-random attrition from the survey. This is 
important because results may be biased if the reason for leaving the sample is related to the 
behaviour being modelled, as might be the case if the adverse event affects decisions to leave 
the municipality of residence. Recall that we carry out the analysis using outcomes of 12-17 
year old children from the second and third surveys. In order to capture who should be in our 
sample at the second survey, we take the sample of children aged 11-16 at the first survey 
who should be 12-17 at the second survey, one year later, and thus in our sample. If they are 
not observed at the second survey, they are taken to have attrited.  We pool them with the 
sample of children aged 10-15 at the second survey who should be 12-17 at the third survey, 
two years later, and thus in our sample. Overall, around 16% of individuals have left the 
sample in either of the two surveys.  
 
Although we do not know why individuals left the sample, we can compare the baseline 
characteristics of those that did and did not subsequently leave the sample. This comparison is 
shown in Table 5. The main difference between children who did and did not leave the 
sample is that those who left are more likely to be from households in which the head and 
spouse are relatively older, and from relatively less educated households, though differences 
are very small. Nonetheless, this does not alleviate concerns that they may be different along 
unobservable dimensions, so potential selection biases in the data cannot be ruled out, which 
we need to account for in our empirical work. We return to this in section 3, though it is worth 
noting, in advance of our results, that it makes little difference to the effects we estimate. 
Table 5 Comparison of characteristics across children that leave the sample 
at any time after the first survey and those that do not 




Did attrit  P-value 
difference 
Age of head  45.691  46.661  0.000 
Age of spouse  41.652  42.736  0.000   17
Head no education  0.276  0.313  0.001 
Spouse no education  0.237  0.274  0.000 
Head some education  0.597  0.571  0.028 
Spouse some education  0.643  0.625  0.082 
Head high education  0.111  0.096  0.017 
Spouse high education  0.12  0.101  0.007 
# female adults in 
household 1.403  1.376  0.069 
# male adults in household  1.369  1.326  0.031 
Treated area  0.584  0.577  0.651 
Altitude 572.611  584.504  0.666 
Crop loss at first survey  0.129  0.129  0.967 
Owns house  0.976  0.972  0.209 
      
# individuals   21,806   4,147    
NOTES:- The sample consists of individuals at the first (second) survey  
who would have been aged 12-17 by the time of the second (third) survey,  
see text.  
3  Empirical Methodology 
To estimate the effects of the departure of the head on children’s school and work 
participation, we estimate the following model 
12 3 4 ijt jt ijt h t j t ijt yV X W f u α αα α δ ′ ′ ′ =+ + + +++  (1) 
 
where i denotes child, j denotes household and t denotes time, yijt is a discrete indicator for 
participation in school or work, Vjt is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the head has left the 
household permanently since the previous wave (due to death, divorce, or with partner – see 
section 2.2.2), and 0 otherwise, Xijt is a vector of observed time-variant characteristics 
including age of the child, number of siblings and quadratics, Wh′t  includes observed 
characteristics of the head at the time of the survey (gender, education level, relationship to 
the child) and the composition of adults in the household at the time of the survey, all of 
which are likely to change between surveys for households in which the head has departed, fj 
includes unobserved time-invariant household characteristics, δt is a survey round dummy,   18
and uijt is an error term that we assume to be iid. The coefficient of interest is α2, the effect of 
departure of the head on the outcome of interest.  
 
We estimate equation (1) using a linear probability model (LPM) and cluster the standard 
errors at the municipality level to adjust for possible correlations of household decisions 
within the same municipalities. Although the dependent variable is discrete, in our case the 
main advantage of the linear model over discrete choice models is that it is considerably 
easier to incorporate fixed effects. Another point to note is that in our application most of the 
explanatory variables are discrete and take on only a few values, strengthening the case for 
the LPM (Wooldridge, 2003). A drawback of the LPM is that the assumptions of normality of 
the error term are likely to be violated, in particular when the mean of the dependent variable 
is close to zero or one. However, this is not such a concern in our sample, where the school 
enrolment rate is around 75%, and the work participation rate amongst boys is around 15%.
7  
Another potential limitation of the LPM is that it can yield predicted probabilities outside the 
unit interval, though in our case it is not a big concern as at most 3% of predictions lie outside 
the unit interval.  
 
Note also that we checked for robustness of our results to this linear specification, by 
estimating a fixed effects logit model (Honoré, 2002). The estimates, though less precisely 
estimated as they are based on the subset of children who changed their activity over time, 
                                                 
7 Paid work participation for girls is only around 5%, so we do not consider this outcome.   19




As discussed above, an important issue in considering the effects of this adverse event on 
child activities is that it may be correlated with unobserved household characteristics that 
have a direct effect on child schooling and work. If these unobserved characteristics are fixed 
over time, we can use a fixed effects model to control for spurious correlations between the 
adverse event and children’s outcomes.
9   
 
Another issue that arises in estimating equation (1), discussed in section 2.3, is that non 
random attrition, if present, will yield inconsistent parameter estimates.  To investigate this 
potential problem, we use a standard correction in a two-step sample selection model 
(Heckman, 1979). The probability that the individual does not leave the survey, shown in 
equation (2), is estimated using a Probit 
  12 1 34 Pr( 1) ijt jt ijt j ijt SZ X t v β ββ β η − ′ ==+ + + ++     (2) 
where Sijt takes the value one if individual i from household j does not leave the survey in 
wave t, and zero otherwise, Zjt-1 are the instruments used for identification, discussed below, 
Xijt are individual and household characteristics at wave t, t is a time dummy variable, and  j η  
is a household-level fixed effect, which may be correlated with fj in equation (1). 
 
                                                 
8 The number of observations drops considerably when using this method, as only around 
30% (22%) of our sample of boys changed their schooling (work) behaviour over time for 
example. The main estimates are shown in Table A1 of the appendix. 
9 A Hausman test rejected the validity of random effects in favour of fixed effects at less than 
the 1% level.   20
The instrument set Zjt-1 includes the interview date and whether the respondent is the head or 
spouse, both measured in the previous survey. Both may affect the overall experience of the 
interview and thus willingness to be re-interviewed. We believe that the identifying 
assumption that they have no independent effects on the outcomes of interest is plausible, 
particularly as they relate to the previous wave, so they are unlikely to affect the current 
activities of children.  
 
The estimates from equation (2) are shown in Table A2 in the appendix. The instruments are 
jointly significant at the 1 per cent level. We use these estimates to construct the inverse mills 
ratio, which is appended to the set of control variables in equation (1). The selection 
correction term turns out to be in most cases not significant at convention levels, and the 
parameters change very little when it is included in equation (1). As this selection correction 
term does not change our results, we do not correct for it in the rest of the analysis.  
4  Results  
4.1  Boys  
We first show the results for boys, in Table 6 below. We see from column 1 that the departure 
of the head has a significant negative effect on boys’ school enrolment, of around 10 
percentage points, and from column 2 we see that it increases significantly their participation 
in paid work, again by around 10 percentage points. Note that these results, and all that 
follow, are robust to including a variety of other background characteristics in the regression, 
which are listed in the note to the table.  
 
As discussed in section 2, there are several reasons why these negative effects on schooling 
and positive effects on work may be expected. One important channel that was discussed was   21
the fact that households whose heads left due to death or divorce incur a substantial reduction 
in income.
10 We thus investigate the extent to which the income loss associated with the 
departure of the head explains the estimated impacts. We investigate this in a number of 
ways. First, we look at whether the effects are larger for households that are more likely to 
face credit constraints and insurance market failures - those living in more remote ‘rural’ 
areas and those with relatively low levels of pre-adverse event wealth - for whom ways to 
mitigate the impacts of such income losses are more limited, at least in the short run. We do 
this for both schooling and paid work, as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 and in Table 7. 
Second, we investigate whether we obtain similar findings when we consider a different type 
of income shock, a crop loss, shown in Table 8.  
 
Results for the specification in which we interact the adverse event with a dummy variable 
that takes the value one for the less urbanised (more remote) areas of rural municipalities, 
areas in which credit and insurance markets are more likely to be thin, are shown in columns 
3 and 4. We see in column 3 that the negative impacts on school participation are entirely 
driven by relatively more remote ‘rural’ areas. In column 4 we find that the increase in paid 
work participation that occurs as a result of the adverse event is observed in such ‘rural’ areas 
only. Though this result could also be due to more flexibility on the labour market in such 
rural areas, where children can more easily obtain informal work to cope with the adverse 
event, we probe further the income loss channel in what follows. 
                                                 
10 Recall we restrict the variable of interest to departures of those that previously worked and 
thus contributed to household income, though we also control for other departures.   22
Table 6 Marginal effects of the adverse event on the schooling and paid work of boys, all 
areas. 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 




   
Adverse event
1  -0.105* 0.093**  -0.017  0.048 
  (0.048)  (0.035) (0.061) (0.042) 
Adverse event * rural
2     -0.184*  0.094+ 
     (0.072)  (0.052) 
Observations  11593  11604 11593 11604 
Number of households  5756  5758  5756  5758 
P-value test of joint 
significance 
   0.001  0.002 
NOTES:- Marginal effects from a fixed effects linear probability model reported (see 
equation (1)). Also control for departure of non-working heads/departure of heads for 
unknown reason, time dummy, age dummies, sibling composition, number of adults, female 
adult composition, and current head’s age, sex and education level. Robust standard errors 
clustered at municipality level in parentheses.
 + significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.
 
2 Marginal effect of the adverse effect in rural areas is the sum of 
1 and 
2. P-value for its 
significance is in the last row of the table. 
 
We next investigate whether within rural areas, the effects are larger for relatively poorer 
households, who are likely to face the more binding liquidity constraints. We use household 
total consumption measured in the first survey (i.e. before the adverse event happened) as a 
proxy for household wealth.
11 We see from column 1 of Table 7 that the negative effect of the 
departure of the head on school participation in rural areas is mitigated significantly by (pre-
                                                 
11 This comprises consumption of food items, both bought and self-produced (auto-
consumption of food items has been measured using detailed information on quantities of 
different food items consumed and prices in the municipality (see Attanasio and Mesnard, 
2006), as well as expenditures of other items such as heating, shoes, cloths and so on. All of 
these are measured at the first survey, i.e. before the shock occurred. This measure is of better 
quality in our surveys than household income, and is arguably more exogenous to household 
decisions, providing us with a good proxy for household wealth.   23
departure) household wealth. This is again consistent with credit and insurance market 
constraints being important for these households. A parallel result holds for paid work 
participation, which increases after the adverse event for relatively poor households only, as 
shown in column 2 of the table. As these coefficients are difficult to interpret, Figure 1 shows 
the total impacts of the adverse event plus its interaction with wealth at different wealth levels 
for school and paid work participation. It shows that for richer households, the adverse event 
has no impact on participation in school or paid work. 
Table 7 Marginal effects of the adverse event and its interaction with wealth on the 
schooling and paid work of boys, rural areas 
 
NOTES:- Marginal effects from a fixed effects linear probability model reported (see 
equation (1)). Also control for variables listed in note to Table 6. Robust standard errors 
clustered at municipality level in parentheses.
 + significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 school  paid  work 
  
Adverse event
1 -5.446*  4.844** 




 (0.192)  (0.115) 
    




P-value test of 
joint 
significance 
0.012 0.001   24
Figure 1 Impact of the adverse wealth on school and work participation,  
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To further investigate the income loss channel, we next consider whether children’s activities 
are affected by a crop loss.
12  The reason for this is that it is also likely to pick up a substantial 
income loss - indeed household income is around 19% lower in households that had a crop 
loss
13 - but is less likely to affect within-household decision-making and does not involve the 
loss of a parent. Though it may have other implications - it may affect the outside options of 
children in the labour market for example - finding similar results with this event would 
suggest that the income loss, common to both, is an important channel behind the effects.   
 
The impacts of the crop loss on school and work participation in rural areas are shown in 
Table 8. We observe no significant effects on 12 to 17 year olds overall (columns 1 and 2). 
We then allow for heterogeneous effects of the crop loss for boys aged 12 to 13 (columns 3 
and 5), and for those aged 14 to 17 (columns 4 and 6). We find that the reductions in school 
participation and the increases in paid work participation observed in Table 6 for the adverse 
event are here confined to the older age group.  Moreover, the school participation of 12 to 13 
year olds increases significantly after the crop loss (column 3).  A possible explanation for 
this is that opportunities for non-remunerated work on the farm may decrease, and boys, 
mainly older ones, may turn instead to paid work, whereas younger boys go more to school.
14 
                                                 
12 The variable crop loss takes the value one if the household reports having been affected by 
a crop loss in either of the two years prior to the survey.  Unlike Beegle et al (2006a), we 
unfortunately do not know the magnitude of the crop loss.  
13 This is estimated from the same regression as in Table 2. 
14 In contrast, we find no significant impacts on schooling for boys in urban areas, where job 
opportunities are less affected by crop losses, and paid work of 14-17 year olds increases by 
only around 3.5%, which is significant only at the 14 % level.   26
Table 8 Marginal effects of crop loss on the schooling and paid work of boys, 
rural areas 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 















            
Crop loss  -0.012  0.007  0.193**  -0.068+  -0.022  0.064* 
 (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.064)  (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.030) 
Observations 6084 6091  2220  3864  2220  3871 
Number of 
households 
2959 2960  1822  2368  1822  2370 
NOTES:- Marginal effects from a fixed effects linear probability model reported (see 
equation (1)). Also control for variables listed in note to Table 6. Robust standard 
errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses.
 + significant at 10%; *significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
Taken together, the pattern of results points towards the existence of capital and 
insurance market imperfections, with adverse implications for the human capital 
accumulation of boys aged 12 and over, who appear to play a potentially important 
role in cushioning the household against negative income shocks. Whilst one cannot 
rule out the psychological impacts of a parent departing playing a role too, we believe 
they are of secondary importance to the income loss channel. First, we have no reason 
to believe that psychological impacts would be stronger in remote rural areas, or 
would vary with wealth levels. Second, we tested whether the effects are driven by 
households in which it was the father who departed (80% of households): they are not.  
Third, we estimated the effects of the adverse event on 7-11 year olds and found no 
evidence of any effects, which again would be hard to reconcile with the 
psychological impacts being important. Another channel discussed in section 2 was a 
change in bargaining power. We should note that using two measures of bargaining 
power (explained in detail in the next section), we did not find any evidence that 
changes in bargaining power within the household explain the findings for boys.   27
4.2  Girls  
We now go on to consider the impacts of the adverse event on the schooling of girls, 
shown in Table 10.
15 We see from the first column that there is a significant increase 
in school enrolment after the adverse event, of just under 10 percentage points. We 
first investigate whether this finding masks heterogeneous effects across different 
subgroups. Column 2 of the table tests for heterogeneous effects by rural/urban area, 
and finds no evidence of any - the positive impacts holds in both. We then test for 
heterogeneous effects by household wealth (measured before the adverse event – see 
footnote 11). We do this in urban and rural areas together (column 3), as well as in 
rural areas only (column 4), where we expect credit and insurance market failures to 
be relatively more acute. The lack of heterogeneous impacts along these dimensions 
and the absence of any significant impact of crop losses (shown in column 5)
16, 
provide no evidence that the income loss associated with the adverse event adversely 
affects the schooling of girls.  
 
One potential factor behind the positive impacts is that if death of the head was 
preceded by illness, girls may have been more likely to stay out of school to take care 
of him and then returned to school upon the death. Whilst we cannot observe to what 
extent this is going on, if it is a factor, then the positive impact should be driven by 
households in which the head left due to death. However when we interact the adverse 
event with an indicator variable for whether death was the reason for departure, we 
                                                 
15 We do not consider paid work for girls, as participation is close to 5%, which raises 
concerns about the use of a linear probability model, as discussed in section 3. 
16 As for boys, we tested for heterogeneous impacts of the crop loss for young and old 
girls, and found no evidence of any.   28
find no evidence that the positive impact is driven by households in which the head 
died (column 6 of Table 10).  
 
Of the three channels discussed in section 2 through which departure of the head may 
affect schooling - income loss, loss of a parent and change in bargaining power - the 
one which could be potentially beneficial for schooling is the change in bargaining 
power.  There is ample evidence in the literature that the sex of the head matters for 
decision-making, with income controlled by women more likely to translate into 
higher household food expenditures and calorie intake and expenditures on health, 
education, and household services, than income controlled by men (Hoddinott and 
Haddad 1995; Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997; Thomas 1990).    
 
In 96% of households that suffer the adverse event, it is a male head that leaves and a 
female that becomes the new head, so increased female empowerment may be a 
potentially important factor behind the observed impacts. To test this further, we 
consider two proxies for increased bargaining power of the new head, and test for 
heterogeneous effects of the adverse event along these dimensions. They are (1) the 
new head has a lower level of education than the previous head (2) the new head is 
younger than the previous head. For new heads that were already of a similar or 
higher education level or age as the previous head, we assume that they do not see an 
important increase in decision-making power.  
 
In order to investigate whether these proxies are in fact correlated with decision-
making, we use a module administered specifically to married women containing a   29
series of questions on decisions related to the household.
17 We use this information 
from the first survey, i.e. before any adverse event happened. Women are asked 
whether, when they receive extra money, they (a) decide how to spend it themselves, 
(b) are obliged to give it to their husband, (c) decide with husband, or (d) have to 
consult other household members. Around 42% of respondents respond (a) and 53% 
respond (c). We assume that women who respond (a) have relatively more decision-
making power than the others. In Table 9 we correlate this with our two proxies for 
bargaining power - relative education levels and age. We see that wives with lower 
education than their husbands appear to have lower power in decision-making; the 
same is also true for younger wives: though the differences are not large, they are 
significant at the 10% level or lower. This gives us more confidence in these 
measures.  
Table 9 Bargaining power proxies correlated with reported decision-making 
power 
  Spouse has full 
power to decide 




Spouse has lower education than partner  40.34   
Spouse has higher education than partner  42.89  0.087 
    
Spouse is younger than partner  41.30   
Spouse is older than partner   44.25  0.025 
    
NOTES:- Data from first survey. 
 
We thus proceed to investigate whether the adverse event has different impacts 
depending on whether the new head has “increased bargaining power”, measured as 
discussed already by (1) the new head has a lower level of education than the previous 
                                                 
17 We do not have this information for those who are not married, and so we lose 
around 25% of our sample in this part of the analysis.   30
head (2) the new head is younger than the previous head. Results are shown in 
columns 7 and 8 of Table 10. We find some evidence that the increase in schooling 
amongst girls that occurs after the adverse event is mainly driven by households in 
which the head sees an increase in bargaining power. Such effects are significant at 
the 10% level or less.  
Table 10 Marginal effects of the adverse event on schooling of girls  
 
















Adverse event * rural
2  0.036 
(0.080) 
      
Adverse event * 
wealth 




    
Crop  loss       0.016 
(0.024) 
   
Adverse event * 
death
3 
      0.041 
(0.085) 
  




       0.129 
(0.087) 
 




        0.105 
(0.076) 
Observations  10012  10012  9723 4895 4996  10012  7909 8060 
Number of 
households 
5341 5341 5181 2608 2662 5341 4181 4264 
p-value test joint 
significance 
 0.062  0.885  0.214  0.076  0.089  0.060 
NOTES:- Marginal effects from a fixed effects linear probability model reported (see equation (1)). 
Also control for variables listed in note to Table 6. Columns (4) and (5) estimated in rural areas only. 
Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses.  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
2 Marginal effect of the adverse effect in rural areas is the sum of 
1 and 
2. P-value for its significance 
is in the last row of the table.  
3 Marginal effect of the adverse event death is the sum of 
1 and 
4. P-value for its significance is in the 
last row of the table. 
4, (5) Marginal effect of the adverse event for those with increased bargaining power (proxied as 
described in text) is the sum of 
1 and 




Whilst these findings for girls are in contrast to previous work which points to the 
schooling of girls suffering more than that of boys after income losses (Sawada, 2003;   31
Parker and Skoufias, 2006), the important difference with our work is that the adverse 
event we consider is also likely to induce an important change in bargaining power 
within the household. We see our findings as suggesting that this channel is an 
important factor in decisions over human capital accumulation, and one that warrants 
greater attention in future such studies. 
4.3  Further Analysis  
Finally, we take a look within the household and test whether there is any evidence 
that the adverse event increases competition amongst siblings: if girls are favoured by 
the new head after the adverse event, we would expect boys (girls) who have sisters 
(brothers) amongst their siblings to be relatively worse (better) off in terms of human 
capital investments, which would stand in contrast to the findings of Garg and 
Morduch (1998) and Sawada (2003).  
 
We show the results of this exercise in Table 11 below, for both boys and girls. 
Interestingly, we find that it is only boys that have at least one sister who suffer after 
the adverse event (their schooling decreases, paid work increases). Similarly, it is girls 
with at least one brother who benefit in terms of schooling after the adverse event.   
Table 11  Marginal effects of the adverse event on activities of boys and girls,  
by whether of not they have siblings of opposite sex 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





  Boys Girls 
























Observations  7230 4363 7235 4369 6525 3487 
Number of 
households 
3877 2388 3877 2391 3745 2005   32
NOTES:- Marginal effects from a fixed effects linear probability model reported (see  
equation (1)). Also control for variables listed in note to Table 6.  Robust standard 
errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. + significant at 10%; *significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
These findings suggest that parental preferences over the activities of children of 
different sexes may differ, implying that there are important within-household 
tradeoffs between siblings of different sexes, at least in terms of investment of 
household resources in human capital. 
 
5  Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the link between the permanent departure of the 
household head from the household and the school enrolment and work participation 
of children between the ages of 12 and 17 in rural Colombia. We find strikingly 
different effects for boys and girls. For boys, we argue that the reduction in school 
participation and increase in participation in paid work following the adverse event is 
due mainly to the income reduction associated with it. For girls on the other hand, 
there is evidence to suggest that the beneficial impact of the event on schooling is at 
least partly attributable to the change in the household decision-maker and associated 
increase in bargaining power of females within the household. All of our results are 
robust to controlling for a range of household and individual characteristics, to 
household level fixed effects, and to potential non-random attrition from the surveys.  
 
Our results have a number of important policy implications. First, they suggest that 
credit and insurance market failures are potentially important in the context of rural 
Colombia, and can contribute to lower human capital accumulation of children. 
Second, an adverse event such as the permanent departure of household heads has   33
potentially important consequences on the schooling and work of children and this 
could be taken into account in the design of safety nets and their targeting. Third, 
empowering women may have mixed impacts, benefiting girls but being detrimental 
to boys when resources become scarcer, as is the case after a permanent departure of 
the household head. This finding is the first of this kind, and offers an important 
agenda for future work. An important question is whether this finding also holds for 
other types of investments than schooling (such as health and nutrition of children) 
and in other contexts and environments. Moreover, due to data limitations, this paper 
considers only the short-term effects on schooling and work of children, though 
longer-term impacts are also important to consider in future work.  
   34
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7  Appendix 
7.1  Robustness  
7.1.1  Non-linear specification 
Table A1. Robustness of main results to non-linear specification 
 
  Boys Girls 
  school paid 
work 
school 
      
Adverse event  -1.171**  1.905**  0.896 
  (0.401) (0.513)  (0.695) 
      
Observations 3439  2517  3439 
 NOTES:- Coefficients from a fixed effects conditional logit model.  
  Also control for variables listed in note to Table 6.   
  Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses.  
  + significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   38
 
7.1.2  Modelling attrition 
Table A2. Probability of not leaving the sample, marginal effects 
  Dep vble=probability of not  










number of children in household at 1



































































p-value test of joint significance of instruments   0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1   
NOTES:- Marginal effects from a probit model (see equation (2) in text). Robust 
standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses.
 + significant at 10%; 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
 